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1. INTRODUCTION 
The EU has led the global effort to increase aid flows to developing countries since 
Monterrey. The Doha Follow-up International Conference on Financing for 
Development (FFD) to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus 
scheduled for the end of 2008 presents a credibility test, as Europe's contribution to 
implementing the progressive development policies outlined at Monterrey will be 
under close scrutiny. The conference aims to evaluate progress and find ways to face 
new challenges and emerging issues. 
The EU continues to shoulder the lion's share of global aid commitments and of 
pledges to Africa. In 2007 the enlarged EU of 27 countries mobilised again large 
amounts of Official Development Assistance (ODA) equivalent to around €93 per 
European citizen to support developing countries in achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). While global aid levels need to grow further, donor 
and developing partner countries also have to ensure that aid delivery becomes more 
predictable and effective. The EU is at the forefront of the international Financing for 
Development process and the aid effectiveness agenda; the Union went beyond the 
Paris Declaration and moved to joint multi-annual strategic planning and is now 
implementing the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development 
Policy.  
2007 has been a difficult year for many Member States that could not cushion the 
expiry of the “one off” ODA-able effects of debt relief measures, initiated in 
previous years, by higher “fresh” ODA disbursements. Overall trends are as follows:  
• EU aid decreased from from €47.7 billion in 2006 (corresponding to 0.41% of the 
EU's collective Gross National Income (GNI)) in 2006 to to €46 billion in 2007 
(equivalent to 0.38% in 2007). While the 15 EU countries, which had pledged to 
achieve together, by 2006, a minimum of 0.39% by 2006, remained above that 
level (0.40%), the overall collective EU result is below that collective target. 
• The decrease of aid volumes is expected to be transitory. If Member States' 
forecasts for 2008 hold true, aid levels should attain again a record high this year. 
• The share of “programmable aid” in total EU ODA has increased, indicating that 
the debt relief spike is over. 
• EU ODA, if expressed in US dollar, increased from $60 billion to $63 billion. 
This trend, resulting from the appreciation of the Euro vis-à-vis most other 
currencies including the US-dollar, generates more than an accounting effect; it 
implies that one Euro could buy more aid in countries whose currencies 
depreciated against the Euro. 
• EU aid to Africa is on the increase: in 2005 the EU pledged to collectively direct 
50% of aid increases to Africa, largely contributing to the G8 pledge to channel an 
additional US$ 25 billion per year to the continent by 2010 compared to 2004 
levels. From 2005 to 2006 the EU mobilised an additional €3.7 billion, an amount 
higher than the total increase in EU aid over that period. There i
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strong commitment by half of those Member States that together provide 80% of 
Europe’s ODA to individually contribute to achieving the common goal. 
• Most Member States are considered “on track” to achieve the 2010 individual 
milestone target of 0.51% ODA/GNI. Some Member States that had fixed more 
ambitious national targets to achieve the 0.7% ODA/GNI goal have decided to 
slow down the scaling-up, by postponing the target date to 2015 (France, Finland) 
or by back-loading the scaling-up (United Kingdom). It will therefore be difficult 
for the EU to attain the 2010 collective intermediate target of 0.56% ODA/GNI. 
This development also impinges on the prospect for the Union to reach the 0.7% 
target by 2015, because efforts to scale up aid have to be further reinforced in the 
period beyond 2010. 
Further progress in the Financing for Development process requires key challenges 
to be addressed:  
• Reinvigoration of the EU efforts to ensure increasing aid levels again as of 
2008 in the run-up to meeting agreed EU ODA targets by 2010 and 2015; 
• Fair burden-sharing between donors of the scaling-up of aid: There is a 
widening gap between the EU and other donors, namely the non-EU G8 countries, 
in their contribution to common goals. Within the EU those Member States that 
lag furthest behind in living up to their individual commitments have to 
demonstrate the political will to move away from persistently low aid levels 
towards meeting the agreed ODA targets. 
• The high volatility and fragmentation of aid flowing from an ever-increasing 
number of actors and funds is a major impediment to the effective use of aid by 
beneficiary countries. Donors have to revert to the available tools to reinforce aid 
predictability (such as timetables for annual ODA increases, long-term strategic 
planning, multi-annual commitments, aligned aid delivery mechanisms such as 
budget support, division of labour) to enhance the impact and effectiveness of 
their aid. 
• Financing of new challenges – such as mitigation of and adaptation to climate 
change in response to worsening climate conditions - are hampering developing 
countries' efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals. Enhanced action 
by the international community is necessary to help these countries to continue 
their path towards development. This includes integrating mitigation and 
adaptation considerations into development assistance as well as developing tools 
with which to screen projects for climate risks.  
• Long-term debt sustainability for developing countries must not be undermined 
by “free-riding” of commercial and public lenders that have not contributed to 
alleviating the debt burden of poor countries under the various debt relief 
initiatives. Engaging into new lending may again jeopardise debt sustainability in 
countries that had benefited from debt relief. 
This report supplements the Communication "The EU – a global partner for 
development – Speeding up progress towards the Millennium Development Goals". 
It is the Commission's sixth annual assessment of Europe's delivery on ten 
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commitments that were made to improve the Financing for Development in the spirit 
of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus. The report presents an evaluation of how Europe 
has moved from rhetoric to reality since that year. The report builds on and assesses 
the opinions of the 27 Member States (EU-27) expressed in their replies to the 
monitoring questionnaire of late 2007 ("Monterrey survey 2008”). Individual profiles 
of the Member States and the Commission are being prepared to reflect the positions 
they expressed in the survey. 
The ten EU thematic commitments relate to the volume and sources of financing for 
development and the quality of aid, i.e. ODA volumes, innovative sources of 
financing, more predictable and stable aid mechanisms, debt relief, aid effectiveness, 
the untying of aid, the mitigation of exogenous shocks, aid for trade, the reform of 
the international financial institutions and Global Public Goods (overview in Annex 
1).  
In line with the Council's request that progress in implementing the EU Code of 
Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy and the EU Aid for Trade 
implementation strategy be assessed in the context of the annual Monterrey report, 
this document is complemented by the Staff Working Paper “An EU aid 
effectiveness roadmap to Accra and beyond" and the “Aid for Trade Monitoring 
Report 2008”1. 
2. THE DOHA CONFERENCE - FOCUS ON IMPLEMENTATION, BUT NEW CHALLENGES 
AND EMERGING ISSUES NOT TO BE IGNORED 
In line with UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolutions 61/191 of 20 December 
2006 and 62/187 of 19 December 2007 the Commission considers that the Doha 
Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD) to Review 
the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus that will take place in late 2008 
should assess progress made, reaffirm goals and commitments, share best practices 
and lessons learned and identify obstacles and constraints encountered, actions and 
initiatives to overcome them and important measures for further implementation, as 
well as new challenges and emerging issues.  
2.1. The EU priorities for Doha 
The UN co-facilitators of the FFD process decided that in the preparatory process for 
the Doha Conference emerging issues are to be addressed in the context of each 
review session, rather than through separate sessions. For the EU it is important to 
underline that this approach confirms maintaining the integrity of the Monterrey 
Consensus, which is not to be renegotiated, while the impact of new challenges 
and emerging issues to the implementation of the Consensus needs to be 
considered.  
The three challenges/emerging issues that were ranked as being the most relevant 
ones by the Member States in the Monterrey survey 2008 were climate change (18 
Member States), aid predictability (13), emerging donors (12) and multiplication 
                                                 
1 SEC(2008) 435 "An EU Aid Effectiveness Roadmap to Accra and beyond - From rhetoric to action, 
hastening the pace of reforms"; SEC(2008) 431 "Aid for Trade monitoring report 2008". 
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of actors and funds, e.g. the role of private donations through philanthropic 
foundations and remittances (nine Member States). The last two issues both belong 
to the more general challenge of the New Global Aid Architecture. The EU should 
promote discussion of these issues in the run-up to Doha as well as during the 
negotiations.  
Effective implementation of the Monterrey Consensus by both developing countries 
and the international community is essential to our joint development efforts in order 
to reach the MDG and other internationally agreed development goals and targets. 
The outcome of the Doha Conference has to reflect in a balanced way 
• the respective responsibilities and commitments of both donors and developing 
countries and  
• ODA volumes and equally other crucial aspects of financing for development, i.e. 
mobilisation of domestic resources and foreign direct investment, good 
governance, aid predictability, aid effectiveness, external debt and international 
trade. 
2.2. The preparatory process  
The President of the UN General Assembly (PGA) has drawn up a two-stage Work 
Programme for the UN's preparations for Doha:  
• The first part of the process will rest on six preparatory review sessions covering 
the six chapters of the Monterrey Consensus, which have been scheduled between 
February and May 2008 in New York. This will be supplemented by hearings 
with civil society and the business sector in June. The outcome of the review 
sessions will influence the second part of the process. 
• The UNGA enabling resolution 62/187 stipulates that the Doha Conference will 
result in an internationally agreed outcome. The nature of the outcome document 
– a first draft is to be available by July - remains to be determined. Negotiations 
on the outcome document will most likely start in the second part of September. 
By that time the results of the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 
Accra and of the MDG High Level Event, envisaged in the framework of the Ban 
Ki-Moon's "MDG Africa-Steering Group" will be known and hence feed into the 
Doha process. 
Doha will be an event of particular importance for the EU, which is actively 
contributing to its preparation through a series of EU Background Papers on the 
Monterrey Consensus chapters. These short documents are for wide distribution by 
the EU Presidency in New York to make the current EU policies, positions, 
initiatives and actions known to our partners. The EU Background Papers will also 
serve as a reference for EU participants in the preparatory sessions, thus ensuring 
that EU statements are coherent and mutually reinforcing.  
In line with the nature of the Doha Conference reviewing the implementation of the 
Monterrey Consensus, the EU feels a ministerial level participation in Doha to be 
appropriate, with preferably a Ministerial Declaration as an outcome. In accordance 
with the UNGA resolution 62/187, the EU expects the modalities of the Monterrey 
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Conference to apply to facilitate civil society and private sector participation in the 
Doha Conference, as well as to allow the European Community to fully participate.  
3. ODA LEVELS: THE EU CONTINUES TO SHOULDER THE LION'S SHARE OF GLOBAL 
SCALING-UP OF AID 
Europe is far ahead of the other G8 donors in attaining the 2005 commitment to 
increase aid by US$50 billion from 2004 levels, reaching US$130 billion in 2010. 
OECD simulations show that the EU will contribute more than 90% of the remaining 
aid volumes that need to be mobilised in real terms in the period 2006 to 2010 to 
meet commitments (€20.4 billion out of €22.3 billion). European aid is expected to 
increase by 43% during this time period, in contrast with US aid, which is expected 
to grow by only 5%, Canadian aid, which will increase by 14%, and Japanese aid, 
which is forecast to drop by 10%. 
Figure 1: Global aid flows 2000 – 2010 (in € million constant 2006) 
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Source: European Commission calculations on OECD/ DAC data. 
If disbursements confirm the latest projections and all Member States deliver on 
agreed ODA targets the EU share in global ODA will grow to represent two thirds of 
global ODA by 2010. This will require the demonstration of significant political will, 
underpinned by corresponding national policy decisions in aid budgeting in 2008 and 
beyond. Only then will Europe remain credible and be able to keep up its reputation 
for being the world's most generous and progressive donor. 
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Figure 2: EU aid levels 2000 – 2010 
(in € million current prices and as percent of DAC ODA) 
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European Commission simulation on OECD/ DAC data and on EU Member States' information 
provided in the context of the Monterrey questionnaire 2008 
3.1. Aid levels remained high in 2007  
Despite overall disappointing aid volume results the EU together maintained its lead 
role as the world's largest aid donor. Nevertheless, 2007 did see the first decrease in 
development finance in Euro terms since the adoption of the EU's aid commitments 
of 2002. European aid levels dropped from 0.41% ODA/GNI in 2006 to 0.38% 
ODA/GNI, with overall ODA amounts falling by around €1.5 billion in 2006 to €46 
billion last year. As a result of the appreciation of the Euro vis-à-vis most other 
currencies in 2007, EU ODA expressed in US dollars was significantly higher than in 
2006. This is more than an accounting effect as it implies that the EU was able to 
deliver more aid for the same amount of Euros in countries where project costs are 
billed in other currencies than the Euro. The following factors meant that the EU 
could not improve its excellent result of 2006: 
• Those Member States that had missed the 0.33% ODA/GNI minimum individual 
target in 2006 fell further behind, decreasing their aid further from already low 
levels (Greece, Italy and Portugal). 
• Several Member States with a high share of debt relief in their ODA of previous 
years were unable to adapt their ODA budgets in time to ensure that aid continued 
to increase immediately after the end of the debt relief spike (namely the UK, 
France and Belgium). The UK's and France's higher than expected aid levels in 
2005 and 2006 (due to speedy debt relief implementation), resulted in a sharp 
decrease in ODA in 2007. 
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• The integration into the EU of the two new Member States Bulgaria and Romania 
with relatively big economies and very low ODA levels as well as continued high 
economic growth in the EU also impeded an improvement of Europe’s collective 
aid levels as a share of GNI. 
Table 1: EU ODA levels 2004 – 2007 
ODA in 
million €
ODA in % of 
GNI
ODA in 
million €
ODA in % of 
GNI
ODA in 
million €
ODA in % of 
GNI
ODA in 
million €
ODA in % 
of GNI
Austria 546 0,23 1.266 0,52 1.193 0,47 1.313 0,49
Belgium 1.178 0,41 1.580 0,53 1.576 0,50 1.427 0,43
Bulgaria NA NA NA NA 1 0,00 16 0,06
Cyprus 4 0,03 12 0,09 21 0,15 18 0,12
Czech Republic 87 0,11 109 0,11 128 0,12 131 0,11
Denmark 1.639 0,85 1.697 0,81 1.782 0,80 1.872 0,81
Estonia 4 0,04 8 0,07 12 0,09 17 0,12
Finland 547 0,37 726 0,46 664 0,40 711 0,40
France 6.820 0,41 8.067 0,47 8.446 0,47 7.261 0,39
Germany 6.064 0,28 8.112 0,36 8.314 0,36 8.961 0,37
Greece 258 0,16 309 0,17 338 0,17 366 0,16
Hungary 56 0,07 80 0,10 119 0,13 66 0,07
Ireland 489 0,39 578 0,42 814 0,54 869 0,54
Italy 1.982 0,15 4.096 0,29 2.901 0,20 2.870 0,19
Latvia 7 0,06 8 0,07 10 0,06 12 0,06
Lithuania 8 0,04 12 0,06 18 0,08 30 0,11
Luxembourg 190 0,83 206 0,86 232 0,84 266 0,90
Malta 8 0,18 8 0,18 7 0,15 8 0,15
The Netherlands 3.384 0,73 4.116 0,82 4.344 0,81 4.540 0,81
Poland 95 0,05 165 0,07 239 0,09 260 0,09
Portugal 830 0,63 303 0,21 315 0,21 294 0,19
Romania NA NA NA NA 3 0,00 80 0,07
Slovak Republic 23 0,07 45 0,12 44 0,10 49 0,09
Slovenia 25 0,10 29 0,10 35 0,12 40 0,12
Spain 1.962 0,24 2.428 0,27 3.039 0,32 4.196 0,41
Sweden 2.191 0,78 2.706 0,94 3.151 1,02 3.166 0,93
UK 6.339 0,36 8.666 0,47 9.932 0,51 7.247 0,36
EU 15 TOTAL 34.418 0,35 44.857 0,44 47.040 0,43 45.361 0,40
EU 10/12 TOTAL 316 0,07 479 0,08 637 0,09 726 0,09
EU 25/27 TOTAL 34.735 0,33 45.336 0,41 47.676 0,41 46.087 0,38
EU 25/27 ODA in USD 43.156 56.344 59.839 63.090
2006 20072004 2005
 
Source: OECD/DAC for 2002 – 2006; Commission data based on Member States information to the 
Commission or the DAC for 2007; shaded cells contain information supplied by Member States, white 
cells are Commission data or simulations. ODA is at current prices. 
There was also significant good news from some Member States that allowed the EU 
to contain the decrease of its collective result: 
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• Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden maintained substantially higher aid 
levels than the 0.7% EU target. Luxembourg advanced on its national path to 
disburse 1% of its GNI for aid in the future reaching 0.90% ODA/ GNI for the 
first time, while Sweden maintained its lead position within the EU albeit missing 
the national 1% target. 
• Spain has to be lauded for continuing its impressive path of scaling-up, 
mobilising additional €1.2 billion – more than any other Member State in that year 
- and reaching 0.41% ODA/GNI, thus largely exceeding the 0.33% individual EU 
minimum target that it had missed by a small margin in 2006. 
• Germany, with € 8.9 billion the EU’s biggest individual donor country in 2007, 
also demonstrated continuing political will to increase aid further and attained 
0.37% ODA/GNI. However, the pace of increase has to be significantly reinforced 
to ensure that Germany will meet the EU individual baseline target of 0.51% 
ODA/ GNI by 2010.  
Figure 3: Percentage share of Member States in EU ODA in 2007 
Share of MS ODA in EU total ODA (2007)
EU12 732 1,6%
DE 8.961 19,4%
LU 294 0,6%
PT 260 0,6%
EL 366 0,8%
FI 711 1,5%
IE 869 1,9%
AT 1.313 2,8%
BE 1.427 3,1%
DK 1.872 4,1%
IT 2.870 6,2%
SE 3.166 6,9%
ES 4.196 9,1%
NL 4.540 9,9% UK 7.247 15,7%
FR 7.261 15,8%
Source: European Commission Monterrey Survey 2008
 
Source: DAC data and European Commission sources (Monterrey survey 2008) 
3.2. EU aid to Africa on the increase 
Africa is the continent least likely to meet the Millennium Development Goals by 
2015. As Africa's biggest donor, Europe, therefore decided to focus the spending of 
additional ODA becoming available on this continent: in 2005 the EU pledged to 
channel 50% of collective aid increases to Africa, contributing to the G8 pledge to 
channel an additional US$25 billion annually to the continent by 2010 compared to 
2004 levels. From 2005 to 2006 the EU has demonstrated the re-focusing of its aid, 
by directing an additional €3.7 billion (and reaching a total of €23.7 billion) to the 
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continent. This represented more than of its entire aid increases over that period (154 
%). In 2006 the EU (Member States and the European Commission) gave together 
62% of its bilateral, regionally allocated aid to Africa, up from 51% in 2005, and it 
provided more than half of the global aid flows to the region.  
The Monterrey survey 2008 intended to check how far the EU's Africa commitment, 
which was only defined as a collective result, was underpinned by the readiness of 
individual Member States to provide at least half of their scaled up aid to the region 
and to contribute to the common goal. 
The replies revealed that there is overwhelming support: 13 Member States that 
together mobilise almost 80% of Europe’s aid declared that at least half of their aid 
increases will go to the continent2 and almost all others confirmed their intention to 
increase ODA to Africa3; some Member States that are new donors highlighted their 
preference for focusing their bilateral development cooperation in other regions 
where they have accumulated expertise (namely in countries neighbouring the EU, 
the South Caucasus and Central Asia) and contributing to Europe’s support to Africa 
through the EC budget and the European Development Fund. 
If all the Member States manage to keep their commitments, the EU may well 
provide more than 90% of the G8's US$25 billion pledge for Africa over the period 
2004-2010, increasing aid in real terms by more than €18 billion per year in 2010 
(and €24 billion in nominal terms)4. 
Most EU countries will channel additional funds to Africa through bilateral aid to 
individual countries in project mode (22 out of 27) and through budget support (10 
out of 27). Contributions to multilateral trust funds (15 out of 27) are also a favoured 
way to increase aid to Africa. 
In many African countries, inflows of foreign aid have a size of macroeconomic 
significance, sometimes reaching a double-digit percentage relative to GDP. In light 
of the weak growth performance of many African countries until recently, growth 
effects of aid and possible limits to macroeconomic absorption capacity need to be 
tackled (see box 1 below). Aid can have substantially positive growth effects when 
the right policies are put in place. 
                                                 
2 BE, DE, DK, FI, FR, IE, IT, LU, MT, NL, PT, SI, UK. 
3 AT, BG, EE, ES, HU, LT, LV, PL, SE  
4 Even if AT, EL, ES, SE and others would not disburse any additional aid to Africa (which is unlikely) 
Europe will still be covering more than 80% of the G8 pledge. 
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Figure 4: EU ODA to Africa (in € current million) including debt relief grants 
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For this simulation it was assumed that the 14 Member States that together provide 20% of total EU 
ODA would not at all increase their ODA to Africa. The 2007 data point is based on an extrapolation 
that imputed multilateral aid to Africa will remain at 30% of total aid to Africa as it did in 2006. 
The following figure shows that the increase of EU aid to Africa is "real" and not 
only a consequence of debt relief. 
Figure 5: Bilateral ODA increase to Sub-Sahara Africa without debt relief 
grants 
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Box 1: The nexus of aid, absorptive capacity and growth 
The Monterrey Consensus recognises that ODA is an important financial source for development, 
alongside domestic resource mobilisation, mobilisation of foreign direct investment and other 
international private flows such as international trade. For these financial flows to propel a partner 
country out of poverty, the principle of mutual accountability must be respected, and aid needs to be 
accompanied by increases in domestic savings, income equality, and good governance within the 
partner country. There is wide consensus that ODA, if well managed, can be very effective at the 
micro-economic (or project) level. Views are more divergent regarding the macro-economic effects of 
aid on long-term growth: 
• Some empirical economic research indicates a "micro-macro paradox" in that successful projects in 
a given country can go along with little or no economic growth effects. Since long-term growth is 
essential for poverty eradication these findings shed doubt on the efficiency of aid. 
• Other development research criticises the applied methodologies underpinning the above finding 
for having a number of inherent weaknesses (country experience too specific to be pooled into one 
dataset for statistical estimates; used aid data may neglect the wide variety of types of aid or the 
fact that there may be diminishing returns to aid; underlying assumptions on the additionality of aid 
do not correspond to reality). 
More basic economic estimations of the aid impact on growth suggest that aid may be more effective 
when countries are poorest. However, recent empirical studies found an increased effectiveness of aid 
in good policy environments which could mean that aid may become more effective in a later stage of 
development. However, many of these empirical results have proved fragile in terms of the robustness 
of model specifications. Nevertheless, there is evidence that once aid flows disbursed for political or 
humanitarian reasons (short-impact aid) are excluded, a positive net effect on economic growth is 
observed for the remaining aid (long-impact aid, e.g. aid to build infrastructure or to support productive 
sectors as well as budget support).  
In the light of the large aid increases pledged since 2002, research has also looked at possible limits 
to the absorptive capacity of developing countries vis-à-vis growing aid inflows. Like other 
investments, aid has diminishing returns after a certain saturation point that will vary greatly from 
country to country. The OECD/DAC recently stated that “the best growth performance recently has 
been in developing countries, allaying many fears about hitting absorptive capacity ceilings.” 
Donors must strike a balance between rewarding those countries with good policy environments, and 
recognising the absorptive capacity limits of these donor darlings, as such countries have had to limit 
their absorption in the face of volatile aid surges, choosing instead to build reserves. Increasing aid 
predictability and reducing aid volatility is important for monetary and fiscal policy to absorb and spend 
aid for poverty reduction without jeopardising macroeconomic stability and growth. Transparent and 
binding multi-annual country-specific commitments from donors are crucial in this respect. This would 
also help donor coordination avoid peaks and troughs of aid over time or across countries. Giving 
priority to spending in areas that increase potential growth, notably in infrastructure and human capital, 
will help to increase the absorption capacity.  
Further research is needed to get more robust evidence since available results point to the need of 
appropriate policy measures to ensure that aid has positive effects on long-term economic growth. 
Sources: 
Burnside, C., Dollar, D. (2000) "Aid, Policies and Growth". Washington DC. World Bank. 
Easterly, W. (2003) "Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No.3 pp 23-48. 
Clemens, M.A., Radelet, S., Bhavnani, R., (2004) "Counting chickens when they hatch: The short-term effect of aid on growth". 
International Finance 0407010 Econ WPA. 
Overseas Development Institute (2007) Budget support and beyond: Can the Paris Agenda on aid be delivered? CAPE 
Workshop Report pg 4. London. 
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3.3. The EU is overall on track to meet the 2010 milestone targets, but many 
Member States have yet to underpin their pledge by sustained action  
In 2005 the EU committed to additional aid targets, aiming to reach individually 
0.51% ODA/GNI (EU-15) and 0.17% ODA/GNI (EU-12) by 2010, while those 
countries that have already achieved high aid levels promised to maintain them. 
Collectively, the EU should reach 0.56% ODA/GNI by 2010. Based on higher 
national pledges of some Member States it was assumed that the collective result 
could be in the order of 0.56% ODA/ GNI. 
Table 2: ODA estimates 2007 – 2013  
ODA in 
million €
ODA in % 
of GNI
ODA in 
million €
ODA in % 
of GNI
ODA in 
million €
ODA in % 
of GNI
ODA in 
million €
ODA in % 
of GNI
ODA in 
million €
ODA in % 
of GNI
Austria 1.313 0,49 1.552 0,51 1.613 0,51 1.675 0,51 1.974 0,58
Belgium 1.427 0,43 2.669 0,70 2.711 0,68 2.818 0,68 2.974 0,69
Bulgaria 16 0,06 68 0,17 95 0,22 122 0,25 149 0,29
Cyprus 18 0,12 28 0,15 33 0,17 36 0,18 41 0,19
Czech Republic 131 0,11 155 0,10 352 0,21 434 0,25 516 0,28
Denmark 1.872 0,81 2.109 0,80 2.222 0,80 2.288 0,80 2.377 0,80
Estonia 17 0,12 35 0,16 42 0,17 63 0,23 84 0,27
Finland 711 0,40 1.067 0,51 1.113 0,51 1.231 0,54 1.419 0,60
France 7.261 0,39 10.810 0,51 12.211 0,55 13.613 0,60 15.015 0,63
Germany 8.961 0,37 13.798 0,51 15.531 0,55 17.264 0,60 18.997 0,63
Greece 366 0,16 1.076 0,39 1.313 0,45 1.550 0,51 1.757 0,55
Hungary 66 0,07 182 0,17 236 0,21 290 0,24 345 0,28
Ireland 869 0,54 1.139 0,60 1.283 0,64 1.477 0,70 1.558 0,70
Italy 2.870 0,19 8.706 0,51 9.822 0,55 10.939 0,60 12.055 0,63
Latvia 12 0,06 20 0,07 76 0,22 102 0,27 127 0,30
Lithuania 30 0,11 67 0,17 75 0,17 93 0,19 134 0,25
Luxembourg 266 0,90 358 0,93 391 0,94 426 0,95 470 0,97
Malta 8 0,15 10 0,17 21 0,33 21 0,33 22 0,33
The Netherlands 4.540 0,81 5.245 0,80 5.478 0,80 5.691 0,80 5.913 0,80
Poland 260 0,09 679 0,17 889 0,21 1.099 0,24 1.309 0,28
Portugal 294 0,19 898 0,51 1.023 0,56 1.148 0,60 1.273 0,64
Romania 80 0,07 247 0,17 361 0,22 475 0,26 589 0,29
Slovak Republic 49 0,09 120 0,17 163 0,21 206 0,25 250 0,28
Slovenia 40 0,12 69 0,17 87 0,20 106 0,23 131 0,27
Spain 4.196 0,41 7.218 0,60 8.114 0,64 9.335 0,70 9.803 0,70
Sweden 3.166 0,93 3.875 1,00 4.029 1,00 4.179 1,00 4.330 1,00
UK 7.247 0,36 12.232 0,56 13.673 0,61 15.385 0,66 17.097 0,70
EU 15 TOTAL 45.361 0,40 72.752 0,57 80.507 0,61 89.019 0,64 97.012 0,67
EU 12 TOTAL 726 0,09 1.681 0,16 2.429 0,21 3.048 0,24 3.697 0,28
EU 27 TOTAL 46.087 0,38 74.432 0,54 82.936 0,57 92.067 0,61 100.709 0,64
2011 2012 20132007 2010
 
Source: Shaded cells contain information supplied by Member States, white cells are Commission data or 
calculations. ODA is at current prices. 
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3.3.1. Timetables for year-on-year aid increases have to be more widely established in 
Member States to help them meet the 2010 individual milestone targets  
The Monterrey survey 2008 endeavoured to track how Member States have prepared 
for implementing pledged aid increases to attain the 2010 milestone targets. In 2007 
the Council had acknowledged the crucial role of year-on-year timetables to ensure 
gradually increasing aid levels and had encouraged Member States that have ODA 
levels below the targets to establish national timetables by the end of 2007. While 
Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden are not concerned by 
the call for timetables as their aid is at or above aid levels, timetables have become 
an issue of political debate in most Member States, which have adopted different 
approaches to tackle the issue: e.g. through multi-annual budget planning or 
development policy documents or in the context of preparing OECD/ DAC 
membership. Concrete overall progress so far has been mixed: 
• Eight Member States have government-wide agreed policy documents containing 
a timetable that leads to achieving agreed EU – or more ambitious national – 
ODA targets, i.e. Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain 
and the United Kingdom. 
• In other countries inter-ministerial work is ongoing towards establishing 
timetables (i.e. in Austria, Greece, Hungary, Poland) or parliamentary 
endorsement is pending (Italy).  
• Several Member States do not mention any intentions regarding year-on-year 
timetables, i.e. Bulgaria, France, Germany, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal and 
Slovakia, while a last group seems to have decided to restrict the scaling-up 
implying that by 2010 aid amounts will be insufficient by a wide margin to 
approach pledged ODA levels (Czech Republic, Latvia). 
The “ODA indicator”-figures 6 and 7 hereafter attempt to evaluate the current 
preparedness of Member States with regard to attaining the individual EU 2010 ODA 
targets. The following criteria – focussing on the longer-term preparedness - have 
been used for assessing how far countries are “on track”: (1) current ODA levels that 
already correspond to or exceed the 2010 goals; (2) current ODA levels at or above 
the 2006 minimum goal of 0.33% (for the EU15); (3) availability of government-
wide agreed timetables. In contrast, while the figures indicate the upward or 
downward move of ODA in 2007 that year’s result is considered transitory and not 
decisive for the overall evaluation.  
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Figure 6: The ODA-target indicator: Are the EU Member States on track towards meeting agreed ODA targets? The EU15 Member States: 
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Figure 7: The ODA-target indicator: Are the EU Member States on track towards meeting agreed ODA targets? The EU12 Member States: 
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3.3.2. Is the forecast collective EU target of 0.56% ODA/GNI of 2010 still in reach? 
The “off-track” situation of some Member States and the decision of others to slow-
down the scaling-up makes it increasingly difficult for the EU to achieve earlier 
forecast collective results in 2010.  
Despite the excellent performance of Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Sweden, current aid estimates indicate that the collective EU target 
of 0.56% ODA/GNI by 2010 agreed by the Council in 2005 may not be met. Europe 
relies not only on the medium-sized donors, but also on EU countries with large 
economies such as France, Germany, Italy and the UK to boost average aid levels so 
as to reach targets. If Europe is to meet the collective target of 0.56% ODA/GNI by 
2010, it is imperative that big players too exceed this level at that date. However, 
some countries with more ambitious national ODA goals have revisited their national 
commitments in 2007, slowing down or back-loading aid flows: Finland and France 
have pushed back the 0.7% target to 2015 aligning their national efforts downwards 
to the EU timetable. The United Kingdom, while maintaining the year 2013 for 
reaching 0.7% ODA/ GNI, will pursue a multi-annual budget schedule that entails 
back-loading the scaling up. Greece is drawing conclusions from the fact that it will 
not be able to move away from low aid levels and indicated that 0.51% will not be 
achieved prior to 2012. 
EU countries that have still not reached the 2006 targets and those that have not 
prepared for reaching 2010 milestones need to demonstrate better political will to 
bridge the increasing gap in the spirit of securing fair burden-sharing between 
Member States. 
An EU linear ODA increase over the period 2006 – 2010 would have allowed 0.43% 
ODA/GNI to be reached in 2007. Not attaining this level, and falling back to 0.38% 
means that €5 billion in ODA has not become available for partner countries. The 
aggregate loss for no linearly scaling up towards the 0.56% ODA/GNI target from 
2006 to 2010 could correspond to more than €17 billion. 
Table 3 shows that aid disbursements in 2007 by several Member States remained 
considerably below forecasted aid levels, sometimes in contrast to existing national 
timetables: e.g. ODA disbursements in 2007 were equivalent 0.43% ODA/GNI for 
Belgium, 0.16% for Greece (0.42% for France), 0.19% for Portugal and 0.36% for 
the United Kingdom. 
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Table 3:  
EU and national timetables to attain ODA/GNI targets  
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EU 15 target 
EU 15 attained 
0.39% 
0.43% 
 
0.39% 
  0.56%     0.7% 
Austria target 
Austria attained 
0.33% 
0.47% 
 
0.49% 
  0.51%     0.7% 
Belgium target 
Belgium attained 
0.45% 
0.50% 
0.55% 
0.43% 
0.60% 0.65% 0.7%      
Denmark target 
Denmark attained 
0.81% 
0.80% 
 
0.81% 
        
Finland target 
Finland attained 
0.33% 
0.40% 
0.44% 
0.40% 
  0.51  0.7%   0.7% 
France target 
France attained 
0.33% 
0.47% 
0.5% 
039% 
0.5 – 0.7 
 
0.5 – 0.7 
 
0.5 – 0.7: 
0.51% 
0.5 – 0.7 
 
0.7% 
 
  0.7% 
Germany target 
Germany attained 
0.33% 
0.36% 
 
0.37% 
  0.51%     0.7% 
Greece target 
Greece attained 
0.33% 
0.17% 
0.33% 
0.16% 
     0.51%   0.7% 
Ireland target 
Ireland attained 
0.33% 
0.54% 
0.5% 
0.54% 
  0.6%  0.7%    
Italy target 
Italy attained 
0.33% 
0.20% 
 
0.19% 
0.33%  0.51%     0.7% 
Luxembourg target 
Luxembourg 
attained 
0.88% 
0.89% 
 
090% 
 1.0%       
Netherlands target 
Netherlands attained 
0.8% 
0.81% 
 
0.81% 
        
Portugal target 
Portugal attained 
0.33% 
0.21% 
0.33% 
0.19% 
  0.51%     0.7% 
Spain target 
Spain attained 
0.33% 
0.32% 
0.42% 
0.41% 
0.5%  0.51%  0.7%    
Sweden target 
Sweden attained 
1.0% 
1.02% 
 
0.93% 
        
UK target 
UK attained 
0.42% 
0.51% 
0.46% 
0.36% 
  0.56%   0.7%   
EU 12 - - - - 0.17%     0.33% 
Agreed individual EU commitments, complemented by Member States' latest information about national ODA 
goals 
3.4. Uncertainty about future aid flows remains a major challenge 
Scaling up aid is essential for the end of poverty, but it has to go along with 
substantial changes in the way donors operate. As aid flows become larger, 
improving aid predictability and limiting its volatility becomes eminently 
important, particularly for those spending programmes – including capital spending – 
that entail long-term recurrent cost commitments, such as teachers' and nurses' 
wages, and that are necessary to achieve the MDGs and for which significant 
financing gaps have been identified. Most Member States (14) have identified “aid 
predictability” as a core challenge to be discussed at the Doha conference. 
3.4.1. The challenges for the donor community 
European aid can be managed to avoid unnecessary volatility that places an added 
burden on partner countries. Doing more, better and faster, requires the entire 
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available tool-set to be consistently applied so as to enhance aid effectiveness and 
- as and where necessary – the adaptation of budget cycles: 
• establishing national timetables to ensure gradually rising aid levels year-on-year 
in the run-up to meeting 2010 and 2015 targets; 
• joint multi-annual strategic planning (joint country strategies and programming 
documents) as a basis for multi-annual financial commitments; 
• improved capacities to forecast aid disbursements to individual developing 
countries in the medium-term. This includes full participation in the OECD/ 
DAC “scaling up for results”-process; 
• more predictable aid mechanisms, that are better aligned with partner country’s 
national development plans, e.g. budget support, namely the “MDG contract”. Six 
countries (Finland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom) indicated that they intend to favour increases in programme aid. 
However, despite the recognition that aid predictability is one of the most 
important issues facing development, an overwhelming majority of Member 
States underscored that they will continue to operate mainly in classical “project 
mode” in the future. In 2007 only one country, the Netherlands, spent more on 
programme aid than on project aid;  
• speedy application of the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in 
Development Policy in an increasing number of developing countries to reduce 
overlap by donors across and within countries, aid sectors, and aid instruments5. 
3.4.2. The challenges for developing partner countries 
Developing partner countries that depend on scaled-up aid to attain the MDG have to 
manage the down-side of aid pledges, i.e. to cope with the unpredictability and 
volatility of aid flows.  
Box 2: The real effects of aid unpredictability: the case of Mozambique 
Aid predictability is at the centre of the debate on how to improve aid effectiveness. Aid predictability 
means that partners can be confident about the amount and timing of disbursements, whereas aid 
volatility refers to year-on-year increases and decreases in aid. Volatile and unpredictable 
disbursements hamper the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals and other development 
objectives of the partner's government, as budgetary allocations are rendered obsolete. If countries 
cannot make the necessary budgetary adjustments, lack of predictability can instead lead to 
macroeconomic instability. 
Aid is more volatile than fiscal revenues and volatility increases with aid dependency; commitments 
consistently exceed disbursements, and disbursements cannot be predicted reliably on the basis of 
commitments alone. The main reason for aid unpredictability in budget support by the European 
Commission and bilateral donors is administrative and political obstacles on the donor side, followed 
by unmet conditionality in partners. 
                                                 
5 More detailed information on these three initiatives can be found in the accompanying document 
SEC(2008) 435 "An EU Aid Effectiveness Roadmap to Accra and beyond - From rhetoric to action, 
hastening the pace of reforms". 
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Mozambique, generally lauded for achieving peace after 17 years of civil war, has received large 
amounts of aid and is highly dependent on it; most of the budget is financed through external sources 
and ODA/GNI has reached peaks and troughs ranging from 56% to 21% over the past ten years. 
Although Mozambique is an "aid darling", volatility of EU aid has been 55% (compared to 40% for 
foreign direct investment) since 2000, partly due to a huge aid surge in 2002 when donors responded 
to floods. Aid volatility is even more marked at sectoral level, so the aggregate national figures actually 
disguise even higher volatility of disbursements. Donor flows are unpredictable, because 
disbursements usually do not match aid commitments, with an average annual difference in EU aid of 
€111 million since 2000. The Government of Mozambique had to make adjustments in the face of aid 
volatility and unpredictability. In times of aid inflow shortages the cost of government borrowing 
increased and crowding-out of other domestic borrowing occurred. At the same time domestically-
financed investment spending decreased. The case of Mozambique also shows that negative effects 
of aid shortfalls are reinforced by tax revenue shortfalls and current expenditure overruns, possibly 
because aid flows are pro-cyclical. Periods of excess aid are not used to accelerate investment 
spending to "catch up" with short falls; this implies that aid volatility has a permanent cost in terms of 
lost output in Mozambique, posing an even greater challenge to the government to reach the MDGs 
by 2015. 
Mozambique and donors have made progress in improving aid predictability, have already signed a 
well-structured Memorandum of Understanding for budget support and have created a shared online 
data base that includes all donor payments and forecast payments almost in real time in a transparent 
manner.  
Table: EU commitments and disbursements in Mozambique (in € million) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 volatility 
Commitments 441 579 1438 371 389 410 466 55% 
Disbursements 683 513 1592 340 305 519 555 58% 
Difference 241 -66 154 -32 -84 109 89  
Source: EC calculations on OECD DAC data; *volatility measured as standard deviation/mean. 
Sources: 
Bulir, A. & Hamann, A.J. (2005). "Volatility of Development Aid: From the Frying Pan to the Fire?". 
Celasun, O. & Walliser, J. (2005). "Predictability of Budget Aid: Experiences in Eight African Countries".  
This calls for economic policies to control inflation, currency appreciation, 
sustainability of internal and external debt and excess liquidity. Prioritising spending 
in areas that increase potential growth, notably in human capital (education, health), 
science and technology capacity building and infrastructure, will help to increase the 
absorption capacity and to reduce the risks of “Dutch disease” effects (see box 3 
below). Capacity-building in monetary policy, public finance and debt management 
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are essential complementary approaches that should include the development of the 
financial sector as it impacts on the effectiveness of monetary policy measures and 
the adjustment capacity of the economy.  
Box 3: "Dutch Disease" –  
the case of Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda
Substantial aid inflows in foreign currency can have adverse effects on a country’s external 
competitiveness through the appreciation of the real exchange rate and contraction of the export 
sector through increased demand for domestic services (“Dutch disease”). The same principle applies 
to other capital flows, such as remittances or income generated from the sale of natural resources. 
Whether or not Dutch Disease occurs depends critically on the fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate 
policy response to aid inflows in partner countries, which determines whether or not foreign currency 
inflows are “absorbed” "not absorbed”, "spent", or "not spent". Depending on the exchange rate 
regime, absorption is controlled by the exchange rate and interest rate policies of the Central Bank, 
which can decide whether to make foreign exchange available for importers (absorb) or to add the 
ODA to reserves (not absorb) Spending is dependent on fiscal policy, and the government spends 
ODA if the ODA is used to finance increased expenditure or to reduce taxation 
The combination of these four policy choices lead to different macroeconomic outcomes. The IMF has 
done in-depth case studies on Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda, finding that the 
countries put in place macro-economic policies to avoid the unwanted Dutch disease effect. In the 
case of Ethiopia and Ghana, aid was channelled into reserves and not spent. With a view to coping 
with highly volatile aid flows, central bank policies may sensibly be geared towards absorbing less 
than available funds by increasing the country’s foreign currency reserves at times of high inflows. 
Foreign reserves: 
• provide a buffer to maintaining macro-economic stability when aid volumes suddenly drop or when 
aid arrives later than pledged; 
• facilitate currency convertibility and capital movements which can provide considerable economic 
benefits; 
• finance current account deficits and defend the exchange rate when inflows decrease. 
The downside effect of this precautionary approach is that neither does the domestic economy fully 
benefit from aid inflows nor is the money used directly for poverty reduction measures. Donors may 
pressure partners to increase spending in response to an aid inflow, which can lead to inflation if it is 
not also absorbed. 
This is what occurred in Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda, where aid was spent but not absorbed, 
which is tantamount to an increase in government spending that is financed by printing money. These 
countries also avoided absorption with the objective to avoid Dutch Disease. In Uganda and (initially) 
Tanzania, Treasury bill sales were used to "mop up" excess liquidity to contain inflationary pressure 
leading to a rise in interest rates and the domestic debt burden. 
Increasing foreign reserves and exercising fiscal restraint may not always be an appropriate policy 
option, especially considering current global macroeconomic imbalances. More desirable policy 
options for partners include absorbing aid flows and ensuring the quality of public expenditure by 
giving priority to spending in areas that increase productivity and potential growth, notably in 
infrastructure and human capital, which will offset the initial loss of competitiveness caused by Dutch 
Disease. On the donor side, spreading out aid flows to cover the donor orphans as well as donor 
darlings will limit the negative impact of aid surges on partners.  
Source: IMF(2005) "The Macroeconomic of Managing Increased Aid Inflows: Experiences of Low-Income Countries and Policy 
Implications"; Washington DC 
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4. IMPLEMENTING INNOVATIVE SOURCES OF FINANCING FOR NEW CHALLENGES, 
NAMELY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
4.1. Mobilisation of innovative finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation 
- an urgent challenge 
Most of the existing initiatives to implement innovative sources of financing, such as 
the airline ticket tax, the International Drug Purchasing Facility (UNITAID), the 
International Finance Facility (IFF) and the Advance Market Commitments (AMC), 
were launched with a view to provide a stable, predictable and, in the case of the IFF, 
accelerated funding for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. 
Meeting the MDGs poses an enormous challenge and climate change will make the 
task even more difficult. Climate change threatens to undermine the achievement of 
the MDGs and thus needs to be systematically integrated into development policy-
making and planning at all levels. In addition, the mobilisation of innovative 
financing will be crucial.  
While many studies have been conducted with a view to establishing the cost of 
future climate change adaptation and mitigations efforts, it remains difficult to 
exactly quantify costs. The UNFCCC Secretariat has estimated that the additional 
annual investment and financial flows needed for mitigation in 2030 may total 
US$200-210 billion and for adaptation, the annual financial flows needed in 2030 are 
US$49-179 billion - of which a large proportion will be required in developing 
countries.  
It will be crucial to focus on the role of private-sector investments as they constitute 
the largest share of investment and financial flows (86% according to the UNFCCC). 
But even with private investments constituting the largest share, the amounts of 
public investment required are much more substantial than currently available funds 
from public sources. It is necessary to attract additional funding from other sources 
by creating innovative financing approaches. It is also important to ensure that public 
funds trigger the mobilisation of significant amounts of private sources.  
Current ODA levels and pledged resources will not be sufficient to help developing 
countries deal adequately with climate change, in both its mitigation and adaptation 
dimensions. The Bali Climate Conference of December 2007 recognised that 
mitigation efforts in developing countries will necessitate appropriate technology 
development and transfer and will thus require adequate resources and enhanced 
cooperation. The Conference also called for increased action on adaptation, to enable 
climate-resilient development and to reduce vulnerability in developing countries, 
especially in the poorest countries and the Small Island Developing States.  
The EU is leading efforts to address the strong links between climate change, poverty 
reduction and the achievement of the MDGs. As a concrete proof of Europe’s 
commitment to transfer clean technologies to developing countries, the Commission 
has launched the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF). 
The GEEREF is an innovative global risk capital fund that will use limited public 
money to mobilise private investment in small-scale energy efficiency and renewable 
energy projects in developing countries and economies in transition. 
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To reinforce the EU leadership, the Commission took the initiative to launch a 
Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) between the EU and poor developing 
countries most vulnerable to climate change, in particular the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) and the Small Island Developing States6. 
Moreover, in December 2007, Commissioner Michel proposed looking into the 
feasibility of an innovative Global Climate Financing Mechanism (GCFM), 
modelled on the IFF structure, considering that delaying action on climate change 
would greatly increase the future costs. This militates in favour of frontloading 
assistance. One of the key issues for such a Global Climate Financing Mechanism 
will be to secure the reimbursement of the funds that will be raised on the capital 
markets and that will be disbursed as grants to the poorest and most climate-
vulnerable developing countries. One option is a mechanism similar to the IFF for 
Immunisation (IFFIm), which relies chiefly on long-term budget commitments from 
supporting countries, based on ODA. The added-value of the mechanism is the 
frontloading of disbursements. Other approaches that would also ensure 
additionality to current ODA need to be explored: Such innovative financing could 
be linked to the carbon market, like a share of the revenue generated by the 
auctioning of emission rights in the EU's future Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). 
Airline ticket levies, which have been used by France to back the IFFIm and to 
finance the International Drug Purchase Facility (UNITAID), could also be 
considered.  
The Commission's package of January 23, 2008 on "Climate action and renewable 
energy package" includes the proposal to generate predictable finance through 
auctioning of emission trading allowances. The auctioning process will generate 
significant revenues for Member States, which will help adjusting towards a low 
carbon economy, supporting research and development and innovation in areas like 
the capturing and storage of 'renewables' and carbon, helping developing countries 
and emerging economies to adapt to climate change and to invest in energy 
efficiency. 
Other proposals, such as the Clean Technology Fund, launched by the UK, the US 
and Japan, are geared towards direct funding from the national budgets. 
4.2. A small number of EU Member States is promoting innovative sources and 
instruments  
A number of potential financing tools might be used for climate change or other 
Global Public Goods, without being necessarily linked to a frontloading mechanism.  
During 2007 three EU countries (Cyprus, France, the UK) mobilised funds through 
innovative mechanisms and five contributed to innovative instruments while nine 
Member States are in the process of assessing or introducing new mechanisms. 
However, most EU countries are not considering participation in any of the existing 
innovative sources and instruments. 
                                                 
6 Communication from the Commission of 18 September 2007: Building a Global Climate Change 
Alliance between the European Union and poor developing countries most vulnerable to climate 
change. Council Conclusions of 20 November 2007 on a Global Climate Change Alliance between the 
European Union and poor developing countries most vulnerable to climate change. 
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• Air ticket contributions: France and the UK have an air ticket tax but, unlike 
France, the UK did not earmark any proceeds for development finance. 
Luxembourg will collect voluntary contributions from aid passengers as of 
April 2008. Cyprus has also introduced an air ticket tax, but has yet to sort out 
legal constraints relating to the contract with the private airport operator. In 2007, 
Portugal's Parliament recommended studying the introduction of an airline ticket 
tax. 
• Cyprus (€800,000) and France (€164 million) paid their proceeds from the air 
ticket tax to the International Drug Purchase Facility (UNITAID) and the UK 
contributed £13.7 million (€19 million) through regular ODA. 
• International Financing Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm): The 
disbursements of the UK (£9,043,200 = €12.6million), France (€19.2 million), 
Italy (€5.76 million), Spain (€9.1 million) and Sweden (€1.9 million) under their 
existing long term commitments served the backing of the IFFIm, following the 
first bond issue of US$ 1 billion in 2006. 
• In February 2007, the UK and Italy (together with Canada, Norway, Russia and 
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation) launched the first Advance Market 
Commitment (AMC) for the pneumococcal disease, under which the first 
disbursements are expected in 2008. Spain has expressed interest in a further 
AMC for malaria. 
• Financial and currency transaction levy: Belgium and France had earlier 
introduced legislation to tax such transactions; its effective implementation is 
linked to the existence of a similar levy in the other EU Member States. Austria 
and Italy expressed interest in introducting a tax on financial or currency 
transactions at the EU level. 
• Climate change gives a new boost to work on innovative financing and appears 
to inspire some Member States that have so far been reluctant to take a fresh look 
on innovative finance:  
– Germany has announced a new initiative on auctioning its CO2 emission 
allowances that is expected to raise €400 million annually, a large share of which 
will be made available for climate-related funding in developing countries. 
– The UK underscored the need for the EU to promote innovative sources of 
financing for climate change, for a decision at the Conference of Parties in 
Copenhagen in December 2009. 
• The Leading Group on solidarity levies initiated by France in 2006 with a view 
to presenting a platform of proposals for the Doha Conference is also discussing 
the contribution of carbon trade revenues to climate change adaptation and 
mitigation. Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Luxembourg and the UK 
participate in this forum, and Finland and Italy joined in 2007, demonstrating their 
renewed interest in the debate on innovative sources of financing. 
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4.3. Policy recommendations 
• Additionality: Innovative sources of financing should be effectively in addition to 
the Member States' ODA commitments and must not distract attention and finance 
from achieving the MDGs and other internationally agreed development 
objectives. Existing resources for development should take into account climate 
change considerations. 
• Effectiveness: The implementation in recipient countries of actions supported by 
innovative sources of finance has to respect the aid effectiveness principles, in 
terms of ownership, alignment, harmonisation and accountability. It is therefore 
crucial to avoid a multiplication of parallel implementing structures. Innovative 
finance must rely, as much as possible, on existing development institutions and 
financing instruments, including, where applicable, budget support. 
• Transaction and financial costs possibly entailed by these instruments require 
special attention: A cost-effective approach is therefore needed to assess their real 
added value in terms of stability, predictability and scaling-up of development 
finance. 
5. NEW CHALLENGES TO DEBT SUSTAINABILITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
The EU commitments on financing for development were reviewed in 2005, prior to 
the launch, by the G8, of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative and the UN Summit. 
At that time the debt-related revised commitment focussed on support for a 
mechanism to alleviate multilateral debt. As a result the reference text regarding debt 
as part of the revised EU 2005 commitments is partially outdated.  
5.1. The implementation of the HIPC initiative and the challenge of preserving debt 
sustainability 
Member States, in their replies to the 2008 Monterrey survey, generally shared the 
view that debt sustainability is crucial for achieving the MDGs and that good 
progress was made in recent years to restore debt sustainability in low income 
countries (LICs). However, challenges remain, mostly related to: 
• The implementation of the HIPC initiative: The initiative is not yet entirely 
funded and faces a low participation by commercial and some non-Paris Club 
official creditors. Moreover, there are challenges for the remaining eligible 
countries to access the initiative, ranging from political instability to difficulties in 
clearing protracted multilateral arrears. 
• Cases of aggressive litigation by commercial creditors and distressed-debt 
funds. 
• The emergence of new sources of financing in the form of lending at non-
concessional rates by non Paris-Club official and commercial creditors and the 
increasing access of low-income countries to international capital markets. 
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Continued participation of creditors and donors in the existing debt relief 
initiatives, namely the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC) and 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) remains crucial – while adhering to the 
principle of additionality as stipulated in the Monterrey Consensus. Whereas the IMF 
and World Bank had reported that some Member States were experiencing delays in 
delivering HIPC debt relief7, those EU countries, in response to the Monterrey 
survey 2008, emphasised that the situation has since evolved positively. 
A related problem has to do with the high cost of clearing protracted arrears to 
multilateral organisations of countries eligible for the HIPC initiative. The cost 
of arrears-clearance can represent a significant burden for creditors and donors alike. 
While some action is being taken in this regard in the relevant institutions (IMF, 
World Bank; African Development Bank), some ACP countries face a similar 
situation for loans provided under earlier European Development Funds. EU Member 
States seem positive to find some solution for this problem. 
Maintaining long-term debt sustainability in low-income countries after the 
implementation of the HIPC/ MDRI initiatives is an important challenge. Recent 
cases of aggressive litigation by commercial creditors that buy HIPCs' debt in 
secondary markets at a discount to obtain profits via litigation have diluted some of 
the benefits from debt relief. The high vulnerability of those countries to potential 
external shocks and re-accumulation of unsustainable debt due to negligent 
borrowing and lending that disregards debt sustainability implications can lead to 
new cases of debt distress. Some non Paris-Club official and commercial 
creditors are lending at conditions, which are neither always fully transparent 
nor in line with concessionality requirements as defined by the IMF/WB Debt 
Sustainability Framework. Furthermore, due to the good macro-economic 
performance in recent years an the lower debt burden, some LICs now have 
improving sovereign credit ratings and are able to directly access international capital 
markets for sovereign borrowing. While this is a very positive development - also 
with a view to developing the local financial sector - it may entail significant risks 
for debt sustainability, particularly in countries with debt-management capacity 
constraints.  
The Monterrey survey revealed that Member States strongly support measures to 
ensure more responsible lending among non-Paris Club and commercial creditors 
to avoid free-riding and aggressive litigation against developing countries. Member 
States support the use of the IMF/ WB Debt Sustainability Framework to guide 
lenders and borrowers' decisions on LICs' new external borrowing. Recently there 
have been further initiatives to deal with these challenges, e.g. in January 2008 the 
OECD Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees adopted a set of 
principles and guidelines to promote sustainable lending practices in the provision of 
official export credits to LICs: The OECD countries commit to respecting 
concessionality requirements, ensuring project sustainability and providing relevant 
information.  
                                                 
7 Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative–Status of Non–Paris Club Official 
Bilateral Creditor Participation (September 10, 2007). 
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However, not all EU Member States are OECD or Paris Club members; this implies 
that they are not yet bound by those initiatives.  
5.2. Policy recommendations 
In the light of the trends and challenges described above, the Commission 
recommends the following measures to be taken by the EU: 
• All EU Member States should continue to timely and fully support the 
implementation of the HIPC/MDRI to ensure that eligible countries do receive 
the pledged debt relief. Regarding protracted arrears towards multilateral 
organisations the European Investment Bank (EIB) should be asked to propose 
mechanisms to deal with the arrears owed to it. Concerning EDF loans, the 
Commission and the Council need to explore ways of minimising the cost of 
EDF arrears-clearance in the context of the HIPC initiative. 
• To ensure long-term debt sustainability the EU should act against free-riding 
behaviour and prevent litigation by aggressive debt distressed funds8. Member 
States should apply the IMF/ WB Debt Sustainability Framework in their own 
lending and aid policies, and apply existing principles and guidelines like those of 
the OECD regarding sustainable lending when providing official export credits.  
• All Member States should apply the Paris Club commitment not to sell claims 
on HIPCs to creditors that are unwilling to provide debt relief. All 
stakeholders should enhance transparency in the process of debt contraction 
by improving data and information sharing in order to help countries that have 
benefited from the HIPC initiative and the MDRI to maintain long-term debt 
sustainability. 
• In other fora, including at the forthcoming Doha Conference on Financing for 
Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey consensus and its 
preparatory process, EU Member States can take co-ordinated action to help 
restore and preserve debt sustainability by supporting: 
– Dialogue with other – multilateral, bilateral or commercial – creditors and with 
borrowing countries; 
– Technical assistance (i) to strengthen debt management capacities of low-income 
countries and (ii) to assist efficient negotiations with non-Paris Club official 
bilateral creditors and commercial creditors with a view to preventing litigation by 
distressed-debt funds and supporting long-term sustainable borrowing strategies; 
– Commercial debt buy-backs, especially for HIPCs, e.g. through the IDA Debt 
Reduction Facility.  
                                                 
8 The IDA/ IMF report "HIPC initiative and MDRI – status of implementation" of August 27, 2008 
reports on the litigation case Donegal versus Zambia", p. 34, Box 5. 
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6. GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS (GPGS) 
In 2008 Monterrey survey Member States were keen to increase the supply of global 
public goods, and there was agreement on the priority GPGs identified by the 
International Task Force, i.e. those related to health and the environment, but 
Member States were not enthusiastic about the recommendations of the International 
Task Force. As a consequence of the Member States' position, and on the basis of its 
own analysis, the Commission did not propose an EU action plan as envisaged in 
2005 when the EU adopted its renewed "Monterrey commitments". In May 2007, the 
Council called on the Member States and the Commission to strengthen their action 
on global public goods through enhanced collaboration and alliance-building with 
developing countries9.  
As the EU has undertaken to support global initiatives and funds, while fully 
respecting its commitments with regard to aid effectiveness, the Monterrey survey 
2008 focussed on the financing mechanisms for global public goods, in particular 
global funds and partnerships. The objective to provide aid more effectively may 
lead to criteria being drawn up for EU participation in global funds10. Global funds 
and partnerships are an opportunity for the EU to strengthen its collaboration and 
alliance-building with developing countries for the provision of GPGs. 
The EU focus on Global Public Goods remains significant; attention seems now to be 
moving towards the delivery and financing mechanisms that can be used to increase 
the supply of such goods. 
6.1. EU trends for investing in global funds and partnerships 
6.1.1. Using allocative criteria to invest in Global Funds and Partnerships 
Most Member States use some form of principles and criteria when taking decisions 
about investing in global funds and criteria. These principles are frequently drawn 
from national development policies and overall strategies, take account of budget 
constraints, and are often in support of the Millennium Development Goals. The 
criteria broadly, rather than narrowly and precisely, guide Member States in their 
decisions. It seems as though Member States tend to adopt a relatively flexible 
approach to such investment judgements, although always respecting their national 
overall policies and strategies. 
There was general support from Member States for the use of common EU criteria. 
However, this interest was qualified by a frequently stated concern that such criteria 
should act as a guide for good practice, but not be imposed and binding on Member 
States. A minority of Member States felt that the EU was not the most appropriate 
forum, or that such an approach would be unlikely to add much value to the 
decisions that each Member States would take. The Commission has looked at a list 
of criteria that could be used. 
                                                 
9 Council Conclusions "Keeping Europe's promises on Financing for Development" 9556/07 of 15 May 
2007. 
10 See para 107 & 108 of the European Consensus on Development. 
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6.1.2. Investment trends 
Overall the replies to the Monterrey survey showed that Member States are not able 
to give a clear picture of their investment plans up to 2010. Whilst many were able to 
provide information about investments planned in 2008, information was not 
comprehensively presented for the following two years. Accordingly, it is difficult to 
draw conclusions on the likely up- or down-scaling of EU investments in such funds. 
Member States, that have historically invested large amounts, indicated that this 
would continue or increase. 
The public goods attracting most interest of Member States for investments are 
health, the environment and education, with nominal, scattered interest in energy, 
gender issues, and research. 
6.1.3. Supporting a country-led approach 
Those Member States that answered this question were concerned to ensure that 
global funds and partnerships support a country-led approach to development in line 
with the Paris Declaration commitments on ownership, alignment and harmonisation, 
and several Member States provided examples of their efforts in this regard. Yet the 
lack of responses from a significant number of EU countries indicates that there may 
be scope to enhance the attention being paid to this issue. The EU needs to continue 
its efforts for effective delivery in support of country-led strategies. The emphasis 
should not be placed on creating new multilateral instruments or global funds, but 
rather focusing on reinforcing coordination amongst donors through joint analysis, 
response and monitoring.  
6.2. European co-ordination mechanism for contributions to Global Funds and 
Partnerships 
Most of the Member States that expressed their view on the issue in response to the 
Monterrey survey were in favour of some form of co-ordination and considered that 
it could improve European coordination and coherence, reduce financing overlaps, 
and improve the visibility of EU contributions to global funds and partnerships, all of 
which should lead to increased impact in poverty reduction. The Commission 
supports the idea of a light but effective coordination mechanism. While several 
Member States did not express any preference, those that are not in favour of 
creating an EU co-ordination mechanism did not explain their response or stated that 
they did not see any potential benefits from new mechanisms.  
6.3. Recommendations  
There is sufficient interest to develop a more common approach to and understanding 
of global funds and programmes in support of the provision of global public goods.  
• During 2008, the Commission, in close collaboration with Member States, will 
draw up common principles for EU investment in global funds and partnerships. 
• In order to enhance coordination, harmonisation and alignment, the European 
Union should create a common knowledge platform on Commission and Member 
States' activities with global funds and partnerships. This would facilitate greater 
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sharing of experience, financing plans, and policy analysis, which would, in turn, 
raise the Union's visibility in such activities and lead to greater impact for poor 
people. Coordination between Commission and Member States in relation to 
funds is especially important at the time of replenishment. 
7. COMPENSATORY FINANCE SCHEMES: A NECESSARY INSTRUMENT OF DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY TO DEAL WITH EXOGENOUS SHOCKS 
7.1. Disaster Preparedness 
Disasters undermine the results of development investments in no time and remain a 
major impediment to developing countries' efforts to achieve sustainable 
development and poverty eradication. The number and frequency of disasters is 
rapidly growing, in particular weather-related disasters, as a result of increasing 
climate change. The European Consensus commits the EU to support disaster 
prevention and preparedness in disaster-prone countries and regions with a view to 
increasing their resilience in the face of these challenges. Evidence has long 
suggested that disaster risk reduction (DRR) has a high cost/benefit ratio, i.e. 
preparedness, prevention and mitigation pay off. 
Most (17) Member States and the Commission fund DRR efforts in developing 
countries on a regular basis from development or humanitarian aid budgets, or both.  
In response to the question in the Monterrey survey regarding planned measures to 
increase the investment in DRR efforts in developing countries, ten Member States 
and the Commission indicated that they are in the process of stepping up support for 
DRR in various ways, e.g. through policy and institutional approaches, including a 
distinct DRR and development policy, inter-ministerial cooperation, working papers 
and guidelines (three Member States and the Commission). Four EU countries and 
the Commission are enhancing bilateral support for DRR at country and regional 
level, by ways of both projects/programmes and improved mainstreaming. At 
multilateral level, four Member States support the UN International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction (ISDR) system to implement the Hyogo Framework for Action. 
Four Member States also fund the World Bank's Global Facility for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (GFDRR) and a single EU country supports the UNDP Bureau for Crisis 
Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). The GFDRR and the BCPR help partner countries 
to build disaster risk reduction capacity at national level. The United Kingdom (10%) 
and Luxembourg (5%) have committed to devote a certain percentage of their 
budgets to disaster risk reduction.  
The Commission provides different funding to promote disaster preparedness: 
• €12 million for the first phase of the ACP-EU Natural Disaster Facility for 
regional capacity building in disaster risk reduction in the six ACP regions. 
Principles have been drawn up for EU investment in global funds and 
partnerships, and additional funds for a phase two have been earmarked. 
• €100 million is earmarked for increased Drought Preparedness and Dipecho 
programmes and the Global Climate Change Alliance. 
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• €25 million is being used for the Global Index Insurance Facility (GIIF), a 
multi-donor trust fund at the World Bank Group. The GIIF will become 
operational in 2008 and aims to reduce the vulnerability of ACP populations to 
external shocks/ natural disasters by expanding the use of index insurance as a risk 
management tool. 
In the follow-up to the European Consensus on Development and on Humanitarian 
Aid and in order to build an EU strategic approach in line with the Hyogo 
Framework for Action, the Commission intends to develop, in 2008, a proposal for 
an EU Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction in Developing Countries. In this context 
the Commission will hold a stake-holder consultation and will engage in further 
consultations with interested Member States. Concerning priority areas that this 
strategy should address EU countries gave a wide-range of recommendations in their 
response to the Monterrey survey, they emphasised:  
• the need to focus on capacity building and institutional strengthening (nine 
replies); 
• preparedness, including early warning as a priority area, at all relevant levels and 
in specific sectors (infrastructure was mentioned repeatedly) (six replies); 
• awareness raising, education and advocacy (four replies). 
• Other views highlight support for the UN ISDR system; a stronger prevention 
focus; risk analysis and monitoring systems urban areas. Further 
recommendations had to do with guiding principles and approaches, such as the 
need to address links with climate change, to mainstream disaster risk reduction 
into development and humanitarian aid and to intensify donor coordination. There 
was also a call to intervene at local and community levels, to take into account 
gender issues and to bridge the gap between humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation, as well as to focus on particularly vulnerable regions 
such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America, South America (Andean Region), 
and South-East Asia. 
7.2. Compensatory finance 
In the discussions about ex-post approaches to mitigate the negative effects of 
exogenous shocks, compensatory finance has always taken a prominent position. The 
EC's Stabex and Sysmin instruments, applied earlier, and the current FLEX 
mechanism for ACP countries, introduced under the 9th European Development 
Fund (EDF), are among the best known examples of compensatory finance schemes 
in the EU. Stabex provided for financial assistance in the event of loss of export 
income generated by specific agricultural commodities, Sysmin did the same for 
mining export income. By replacing the Stabex and Sysmin instruments by FLEX, 
the EC shifted from (sub)sector-specific compensation schemes towards a macro-
economic and budgetary approach. Its prime goal is to "safeguard socio-economic 
reforms and policies that could be affected negatively as a result of a drop in 
revenue…"
11. 
                                                 
11 Cotonou Agreement, Article 68.2. 
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Current discussions around compensatory finance have questioned the desirability of 
continuing such donor-funded schemes when market-based arrangements could be 
used and also led to suggestions for making the schemes more effective and 
predictable. Against this background the Monterrey questionnaire asked for Member 
States' views on the appropriateness of compensatory finance schemes and, if 
deemed relevant in the present-day context, on the most important characteristics that 
such a scheme should have. 
Most EU Member States (17) and the Commission are in favour of keeping an ex 
post compensatory finance scheme for developing countries as part of development 
cooperation instruments. Three EU countries signalled opposition against such an 
instrument, while eight Member States had no opinion yet. 
Concerning the most desirable characteristics of compensatory financed schemes, 
those Member States that replied to the question hold a variety of views, with special 
reference to the level of loss that should be compensated, as well as on 
implementation arrangements. Nevertheless, the following conclusions can be drawn 
from the survey: 
• In terms of the impact of the exogenous shock that would need to be compensated, 
there is a preference to focus on a drop in domestic production (e.g. as 
measured in terms of GDP, although the current account could also be looked at). 
Fewer Member States favour a focus on the drop in export earnings or in 
government income.  
• The focus should be on the effects of both price and weather shocks, i.e. 
looking at a broad range of external causes. 
• The current state of affairs in FLEX whereby governments submit their own data 
on effects of external shocks was not the method preferred by Member States. The 
vast majority of Member States indicated a preference for such data to be 
validated by international organisations, while many Member States would like to 
base the measurement on external, publicly accessible, verifiable statistics (e.g. 
commodity exchanges for price shocks; satellite data for weather-related shocks). 
• The survey also showed that Member States rather support the use of country-
wide indicators than a return to a (sub)sector-based approach (such as Stabex, 
Sysmin). 
• Eligible countries should be Least Developed Countries, commodity-dependent 
countries or a combination of the two. 
The Commission underlines that the eligibility to any compensatory finance scheme 
should be linked to the level of development. In determining levels of support the 
degree of poverty should be taken into account. It will also be crucial to assist 
countries that are not yet eligible to budget support in reaching the MDGs in the face 
of an exogenous shock, and build up in-country capacity to receive budget support 
and participate in market based risk management instruments in the future. 
Furthermore, the feasibility of providing 'emergency budget support' in exceptional 
cases and under specific conditions could be investigated. The Commission also 
 EN 37   EN 
suggests investigating whether the risk of having to pay out rather large sums in 
compensatory finance can be insured and at what cost. 
Most Member States were hesitant about their interest in contributing to an improved 
Compensatory Finance Scheme at EU level. Ten Member States plus the 
Commission indicated they could possibly be interested, while others indicated the 
need for more information before considering this issue or did not reply to the 
question. Five Member States answered they had no interest in joining an EU 
scheme, partly because with the existence of a system such as FLEX they felt no 
need to add bilateral contributions. One Member State favoured working within the 
existing aid architecture for shocks (FLEX, IMF's Exogenous Shocks Facility), but 
took the view that the EU should consider whether it would be prepared to respond to 
requests to provide additional support in the event of increased weather-related 
shocks attributed to climate change. Such support could be delivered through 
existing mechanisms (such as FLEX) or market-based approaches, or a combination 
of the two. 
7.3. Recommendations 
Most Member States and the Commission consider that a compensatory finance 
scheme continues to be relevant in development cooperation and are interested in 
considering improvements to the existing (FLEX) system, also in view of the 
expected effects of climate change. The scope of the compensatory finance scheme 
should be country-wide, focusing on significant adverse effects of external shocks 
(both price- and weather-related; beyond the control of the country) on the economy 
of the country and operate for poor and/or commodity-dependent countries. The 
scheme should work on reliable indicators, but should also lead to quick 
disbursement. 
On the basis of the above, it is proposed that the EC conducts a feasibility study on 
an EU compensatory finance mechanism. This feasibility study would: 
• investigate to what extent the use of external data (price indices, satellite-based 
weather data) could lead to faster decision-making and disbursement; 
• analyse the reliability of external data, the need for validation and the correlation 
with economic losses;  
• assess the financing implications for covering an adequate proportion of the losses 
associated with external shocks in the least developed and commodity-dependent 
developing countries (assessing the ACP countries as well as wider geographical 
coverage);  
• and assess the options and arrangements for covering the costs of such a 
compensatory finance scheme (including the option of providing relatively lower 
grants for richer countries, which could increase the scope of coverage). 
The results of this study should be available in time for the next revision of the EC-
ACP Partnership Agreement by February 2010. Meanwhile the Commission has 
 EN 38   EN 
worked on a partial revision of the FLEX mechanism in order to meet some of the 
concerns raised in the consultation process12, i.e. to move away from compensation 
for worsening budget deficit towards a more GDP-based approach and to accelerate 
the allocation of funds and disbursements to strengthen the counter-cyclical nature of 
the mechanism. The revision proposal does not alter the objective of the FLEX 
mechanism but tackles some implementation arrangements as described in Annex II 
of the EC-ACP Partnership Agreement. The revision requires a joint EC-ACP 
Council decision and is expected to be adopted in the first half of 2008 for immediate 
application to the year 2007. 
8. REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
8.1. Options for strengthening the voice and representation of developing and 
transition countries at the World Bank 
There is broad recognition that changes are required to improve the representation of 
developing and transition countries, which are large borrowers from the WB Group 
but are currently underrepresented in terms of seats on the WB Board. The situation 
is particularly acute for Sub-Saharan African countries which have two seats for 
46 countries, while other developing regions (Latin America, developing countries in 
Asia and North Africa/Middle East) each have three seats for fewer countries.  
In view of the forthcoming discussions at the IMF/ World Bank Development 
Committee meeting in April 2008 and building on the World Bank’s discussion 
paper for the previous meeting of October 2007 presenting options for strengthening 
the voice and representation of developing countries on the World Bank Board, the 
Monterrey survey 2008 explored Member States' views regarding the different 
proposals. All options found some support among the 25 EU countries that 
responded to the question, but with wide variations:  
• A large majority of Member States (22) that together represent 25.92% of total 
votes in IDA would favour an increase of the basic vote.  
• There is also strong support (14 Member States) for the option to open the posts of 
the World Bank President and IMF Managing Director to all countries.  
• 11 EU countries would also consider a selective capital increase for developing 
countries. 
• Increasing the Board size to create a third seat for African countries and 
introducing double majorities for strategic decisions are options that seven EU 
countries would also think about.  
The Commission considers that capping the number of countries per constituency 
and establishing a third seat for African countries would be the best short-term 
option.  
                                                 
12 Commission proposal COM(2007) 337 of 19.6.2007. 
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The commitment among Member States to provide support to constituency offices of 
developing countries on the World Bank Board is less developed: only eight are 
ready to provide bilateral technical assistance, and only two would provide bilateral 
financial support; another eight EU countries believe that developing country 
constituency offices do not need support, whereas 11 Member States would prefer 
such support to be financed from the EC budget or the EDF. The Commission 
supports the idea of supplying technical or financial assistance to large developing 
country constituencies, and would examine the possibility of financing this through 
the European Community budget or the EDF.  
8.2. Overall very positive, but differentiated assessment of the EU coordination at 
the IMF, the World Bank and regional development banks 
Over time the support for strengthening the EU voice and appreciation of closer EU 
coordination in the international financing institutions and – more recently - in 
regional development banks has markedly increased, albeit with variations regarding 
the different institutions: 
• The overall functioning and quality of EU coordination at the World Bank Board 
received the best score (21 Member States); two countries believe that further 
improvements are necessary. 
• According to the large majority of replies (17 Member States) EU coordination 
also functions well at the IMF, but seven Member States see scope for 
improvement. 
• The assessment of the situation in regional development banks was more 
critical. While several Member States are not members of regional development 
banks and either did not respond or preferred to stay neutral in their assessment, 
the majority of those that expressed an opinion underscored the need to improve 
EU coordination. 
Regarding future guidelines for the EU coordination: 
• More joint positions on long-term strategic issues is something that is strongly 
supported by 17 Member States (out of 24 replies to the question) for the World 
Bank and 12 for the IMF.  
• More joint positions prior to annual/ spring meetings are favoured by 12 
Member States in the case of the World Bank and by seven regarding the IMF. 
• Compared to opinions expressed in the context of the annual Monterrey reports in 
previous years there has been a notable shift in favour of a single EU seat, 
although this remains, at present, a minority opinion held by:  
– seven Member States in the case of the IMF (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands),  
– four Member States regarding the World Bank Board (Austria, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovak Republic),  
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– and only two Member States for the regional development banks 
(Austria and Luxembourg).  
– The Commission would consider a single euro-group seat in the IMF 
and a single EU seat in the World Bank as an ultimate goal. 
• In order to improve its supportive role in EU coordination for IMF/World Bank 
Board discussions the Commission would need better access to Board strategic 
documents. Gaining observer status at the World Bank Board would greatly 
facilitate that task; eight out of 22 Member States that replied to this section 
support the Commission's approach; five Member States are explicitly against.  
8.3. The way forward  
The Commission advocates  
• constructive EU cooperation to select the most effective option for strengthening 
the voice and representation of developing countries on the Board of the World 
Bank; 
• further improved EU coordination prior to the spring/annual meetings. In this 
context more references by Member States to EU positions in the World 
Bank/IMF Development Committee would also be an asset for fostering 
effective EU representation and visibility; 
• continuing the upwards trend in common statements by the EU group on the 
World Bank Board, in particular for long-term strategic issues; 
• substantially reinforcing EU coordination on the Boards of the regional 
development banks, based on the good practice in the IMF and World Bank.  
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Annex 1:  
EU commitments on financing for development 
1. ODA Volumes 
ODA target 2006 
“In pursuance of the undertaking to examine the means and timeframe that will allow each of the 
Member States to reach the UN goal of 0.7% ODA/GNI, those Member States that have not yet 
reached the 0.7% target commit themselves – as a first significant step – individually to increase their 
ODA volume in the next four years within their respective budget allocation processes, whilst the other 
Member States renew their efforts to remain at or above the target of 0.7% ODA, so that collectively 
an EU average of 0.39% is reached by 2006. In view of this goal, all the EU Member States will in any 
case strive to reach, within their respective budget allocation processes, at least 0.33% ODA/GNI by 
2006.” 
(Council conclusions of 14.03.2002 on the UN Conference on Financing for Development (Monterrey) 
"The Council encourages those Member States that have not reached the target for 2006 or are not on 
track to achieve the respective individual baseline set for 2010 to make all efforts to reach those 
targets." 
(Council conclusions of 15.05.2007on Keeping Europe's Promises on Financing for Development) 
ODA targets 2010/2015 
“…the EU agrees to a new collective EU target of 0,56 % ODA/GNI by 2010, that would result in 
additional annual € 20bn ODA by that time.  
- I. Member States, which have not yet reached a level of 0,51 % ODA/GNI, undertake to reach, 
within their respective budget allocation processes, that level by 2010, while those that are already 
above that level undertake to sustain their efforts;  
- II. Member States, which have joined the EU after 2002, and that have not reached a level of 
0,17 % ODA/GNI, will strive to increase their ODA to reach, within their respective budget allocation 
processes, that level by 2010, while those that are already above that level undertake to sustain their 
efforts;  
- III. Member States undertake to achieve the 0.7% ODA/GNI target by 2015 whilst those which 
have achieved that target commit themselves to remain above that target; Member States which 
joined the EU after 2002 will strive to increase by 2015 their ODA/GNI to 0.33%.” 
(European Consensus on Development with reference to Council conclusions of 24.05.2005)  
ODA - national timetables 
"Underlining that this issue falls within the competence of Member States, the Council welcomes the 
Commission's proposal on national timetables and encourages Member States concerned to work on 
such national timetables, by the end of 2007, to increase aid levels within their respective budget 
allocation processes, towards achieving the established ODA targets." 
(Council Conclusions of 15.05.2007) 
ODA to Africa 
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“EU will increase its financial assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa and will provide collectively at least 
50% of the agreed increase of ODA resources to the continent, while fully respecting individual 
Member States priorities’ in development assistance.” 
(European Consensus on Development with reference to Council conclusions of 24.05.2005)  
2 Innovative Sources of Financing 
“The Council will continue to consider the most promising options for innovative sources of financing 
for development, in order to increase the resources available in a sustainable and predictable way.” 
(Council conclusions of 24.05.2005) 
3 Debt 
"The Council welcomes the participation of the EU Member States and the Community in the debt 
relief operations, including the HIPC and; if relevant, Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), and 
encourages continued participation while adhering to the principle of additionality as stipulated in the 
Monterrey Consensus." 
(Council Conclusions, 15.05.2007) 
“Debt reduction … provides predictable financing. The EU is committed to find solutions to 
unsustainable debt burdens, in particular the remaining multilateral debts of HIPCs (Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries), and where necessary and appropriate, for countries affected by exogenous shocks 
and for post-conflict countries." 
(European Consensus on Development) 
4 Aid effectiveness 
"…the EU stresses the need to improve in parallel the quality and effectiveness of ODA as well as 
better donor practices and the need to enhance the capacity and economic sustainability of increased 
ODA for our partner countries. 
"…the EU will ensure the implementation of the concrete recommendations contained [in the report 
Advancing coordination, harmonisation and alignment' of November 2004], including a more effective 
framework for development assistance at EU level and division of labour and complementarity at 
country level in the context of joint, multi-annual programming based on the partner country's poverty 
reduction strategies. 
The EU is fully committed to a timely implementation and monitoring of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness including setting monitorable targets for 2010 and of the EU specific commitments 
adopted at the Paris Forum." 
(Council conclusions of 24.05.2005) 
5 More predictable, less volatile aid mechanisms 
The Council recalls the EU commitment to more predictable and less volatile aid mechanisms which 
are crucial for effective planning to progress on the MDGs and acknowledges that speedier progress is 
required for its implementation. Where circumstances permit, the use of general or sectoral budget 
support as one instrument among others should increase as a means to strengthen the ownership, 
support partners' national accountability and procedures to finance national poverty reduction 
strategies and to promote sound and transparent management of public finances." 
(Council Conclusions of May 15, 2007) 
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In order to better respond to the need for stable resources and in view of the expected increases in 
ODA flows, the EU will develop new, more predictable and less volatile aid mechanisms. Such 
mechanisms could consist in the provision of a minimum level of budgetary aid secured in a medium 
term perspective and linked to policy performance in the partner countries, in particular in relation to 
the commitment towards achieving the MDGs in national poverty reduction strategies.” 
(Council conclusions of 24.05.2005)  
6 Untying of aid 
[The Council will address] the challenge of untying of aid by adopting as soon as possible on the basis 
of the Commission’s proposal, a regulation on the access to EC external assistance; the EU will 
support ongoing debates at the international level on further untying of aid beyond existing OECD/ 
DAC recommendations." 
Council Conclusions of 24.05.2005 
"The Council calls on the Member States to support a further extension of the OECD/DAC 
Recommendations that focus on the access for developing countries and promote local preferences. 
The Council calls upon the donors that have not yet untied their aid to make efforts in this direction 
and reiterates that the EU has agreed on further advancing, within the relevant international fora, 
untying of food aid and food aid transport.  
The Council recalls the EU Directive on Government Procurement and underlines the importance of its 
implementation in this context."  
Council Conclusions of 15.05.2007 
7 Exogenous shocks 
The Council urges Member States and the Commission to strike a new balance between ex-post 
natural disaster responses and ex-ante risk reduction strategies, with a stronger emphasis on the 
latter, within a coordinated approach to disaster prevention and preparedness and on which 
developing countries and donors need to intensify efforts to reduce vulnerability against exogenous 
shocks in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action. In that regard it welcomes the implementation of 
an exogenous shock facility within the IMF framework. 
(Council Conclusions of 15.05.2007) 
“Some developing countries are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters, climatic change, 
environmental degradation and external economic shocks. The Member States and the Community 
will support disaster prevention and preparedness in these countries, with a view to increasing their 
resilience in the face of these challenges.” 
(European Consensus on Development) 
“In order to mitigate the impact of exogenous shocks, including price vulnerability, on developing 
countries economies, the EU will support the operationalisation of market based insurance schemes 
and explore possibilities for temporary suspension of debt servicing on a case by case basis. Further, 
the EU will strengthen and improve access to existing financing mechanisms such as those provided 
for in the Cotonou Agreement (FLEX) to give short term cover against the impact of such shocks on 
countries’ revenue.” 
(Council conclusions of 24.05.2005) 
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8 Global Public Goods 
"The Council calls on the Member States and the Commission to strengthen their action on global 
public goods (GPG) through enhanced collaboration and alliance-building with developing countries." 
(Council Conclusions of 15.05.2007) 
“[The Council will examine], on the basis of the report of the Task Force on Global Public Goods, the 
possibilities to establish by 2006 an Action Plan at EU level on the provision of priority International 
Public Goods (IPGs) and agreeing to examine the financing modalities of the IPGs.” 
(Council conclusions of 24.05.2005) 
9 Reform of the International Financial System 
“The EU will …promote the enhancement of the voice of developing countries in international 
institutions.”  
(European Consensus on Development) 
- “[The Council will promote] a joint European position on enhancing the voice of developing and 
transition countries and further improving the quality of existing EU coordination in the IFIs.” 
(Council conclusions of 24.05.2005) 
10 Aid for Trade 
On 15 October 2007, the Council adopted an EU Aid for Trade Strategy
13
 and decided to review 
progress in implementing the Strategy in the context of the Monterrey reporting. The strategy contains 
most of the EU commitments regarding aid for trade.  
“Within their commitments to future increases in development assistance, Member States will strive to 
increase the EU’s collective spending on trade-related assistance …to €1 billion per year by 2010, 
inclusive of spending on the enhanced Integrated Framework. This would bring the contribution of the 
EU as a whole, including the Community contribution, to €2 billion per year by 2010.” 
(Council Conclusions on Trade Related Assistance:12.12.2005) 
                                                 
13 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st13/st13070.en07.pdf 
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Annex 2: 
The Commission's monitoring mandate and the methodology used for the preparation 
of this progress report 
Reporting in response to a comprehensive mandate from the Council:  
In 2002 the Council mandated the Commission to monitor EU progress on the joint 
commitments on financing for development and aid effectiveness. When the Council 
agreed in 2005 to extend and further develop the EU's initial commitments of 2002, , 
it also reaffirmed the Commission's monitoring mandate, asking for annual progress 
reports to be submitted. The objectives of monitoring are to assess progress achieved, 
provide recommendations on overcoming any shortcomings and suggest how the EU 
could further contribute to advancing international financing for development. In its 
Conclusions of May 2007 and October 2007 the Council further requested that the 
Commission should report on progress regarding the implementation of the Code of 
Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy and the implementation of 
the EU Aid for Trade strategy in the context of the annual "Monterrey report". 
Survey methodology 
Since 2002, the Commission has collected information on the performance and views 
of the EU Member States on the different commitment themes through a detailed 
annual survey. The Commission is pleased to note the Member States' ever-
increasing ownership of and confidence in the monitoring process, in terms of: 
• responsiveness: as from the first questionnaire sent out in 2002, all Member 
States in the enlarging EU have responded; 
• the timeliness of replies: overall, Member States have endeavoured to provide 
their contribution more promptly, with the help of close contacts with and 
encouragement (help-desk type support) from the relevant Commission 
department and, as and when necessary, extension of initial deadlines; 
• the comprehensiveness and quality of responses: Member States vary in their 
technical capacity to deal with the financing for development issues covered by 
the EU commitments, some of which are complex and technical. Capacity 
depends on the overall size of Member States' development administration, the 
expertise available in the administration and their cumulative experience of 
development cooperation. While some Member States have a long tradition of 
development cooperation, others have only recently emerged as donors. Despite 
these disparities, all provide increasingly comprehensive replies, albeit necessarily 
diverging in quality. The Commission especially appreciates the efforts of those 
Member States that have joined the EU more recently with nascent development 
cooperation capacity. In some cases, a single task manager endeavours to provide 
a full picture of certain topics. The contributions of Member States with greater 
development experience reflect the involvement of a range of 
experts/services/ministries/agencies. 
Over the years, the Commission has adapted the methodology applied in the design 
of the annual questionnaire and has also acknowledged that analysing the replies 
has turned into a substantially more time-consuming exercise for what are now 27 
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EU Member States. As a result, there has been a move away from many ‘open’ 
questions, as it is more difficult to assess and compare 'open' replies, to more ‘semi-
open’ questions – where a range of pre-defined answers is offered (multiple choice 
questions) – or ‘closed’ questions (requiring yes/no answers). There are questions on 
all thematic commitments, organised in sections that each include a free space for 
comments so that Member States can contribute as they wish. The latest survey was 
sent to the Member States at the beginning of November 2007; the last reply was 
received by mid-February 2008. 
Assessment of the questionnaire by Member States:  
Member States were asked to assess the format of the questionnaire. Most of them 
agreed that the focus was right, i.e. ODA volumes, joint programming, aid for trade 
and global public goods (GPGs). However, 14 MS felt that there were too many 
questions (up from four in 2007), and 12 thought questions were too difficult (up 
from one), although only eight requested more background information (down from 
nine). When asked whether important issues where covered, there were indications 
that the survey should cover more aspects of aid effectiveness, aid to LDCs and 
states in a situation of fragility, and international stakeholders in development. 
Methodology for the analysis of ODA 
• Figures on Official Development Assistance (ODA) are in current prices. For 
2007 ODA figures are based on Member States' replies to the Monterrey Survey 
and on the preliminary ODA results 2007 published by the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) in April 2008). For previous years (2004-2006) 
figures were taken from the OECD DAC for those Member States that report to 
the DAC. For those Member States that do not report ODA volumes to the DAC, 
figures for previous years (2004-2006) were taken from Member States' replies to 
the Monterrey Survey. 
• From 2008 onwards, ODA figures are based on available indications of Member 
States in the Monterrey survey 2008. For Members States which provide ODA 
figures in national currencies the Commission’s annual average exchange rates for 
the respective years have been applied to convert them into Euro. Up to 2009, the 
exchange rates have been taken from the Commission’s autumn 2007 forecast 
and, beyond that, nominal exchange-rate stability is assumed. Where a Member 
State presents only the ODA/GNI ratio, ODA is calculated by multiplying it by 
the Commission’s GNI figure. 
• Where a Member State gives both, the absolute ODA amounts and the ODA/GNI 
ratio, preference is given to using the ODA figure. The ODA in absolute 
amounts gives a better indication of where the achievement of ODA/GNI 
targets is sensitive to differing assumptions on GNI. The Commission's GNI 
forecasts/ projections are used for the individual Member States. 
• When ODA is not available either in amounts or in ODA/GNI ratio, it is assumed 
that the ODA/GNI targets for 2010 (0.51% for EU 15 Member States and 0.17% 
for Member States that joined the EU after 2002) and 2015 (0.7% for EU 15 
Member States and 0.33% for Member States that joined the EU after 2002) will 
be achieved. These ODA/GNI ratios are multiplied by the Commission’s GNI 
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figures for the individual Member States to calculate the ODA in total amounts. 
For the remaining years a linear increase of ODA has been assumed and the 
absolute difference between the ODA amount of the latest year, for which 
information was provided, and the volume required to meet the 2010 and 2015 
targets has been distributed equally over that period. 
• Figures for Gross National Income (GNI) in current prices are outcome for 
2006, estimates for 2007 and the Commission’s autumn 2007 forecast and 
February 2008 interim forecast for the years 2008 and 2009. GNI figures for 2010 
to 2013 are calculated by applying the Commission’s country-specific projections 
of nominal GDP growth rates. The Commission’s projections are based on 
potential output growth estimates until 2013 which were also used for the purpose 
of budgetary calculations in the context of the EU financial framework 2007-
2013. 
